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DO NOT PASS GO; DO NOT COLLECT $200;
GO DIRECTLY TO THE EHB: THE EHB HOLDS FAST TO ITS
REGULATORY ROLE IN INTERSTATE GAS REGULATION IN
DELAWARE RIVERKEEPER NETWORK V. DEPARTMENT OF
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION
I. INTRODUCTION
While countries such as Russia, Iraq, and Saudi Arabia are well
known for their gas production, the United States has recently become the largest natural gas producer in the world.1 The United
States’ increased natural gas production is driven by the expansion
of fracking in the Marcellus Shale formation in the northeastern
region of the country.2 The Marcellus Shale is a sedimentary rock
formation, millions of years old, meandering through West Virginia, Ohio, Pennsylvania, and into New York state.3 Through the
fracking process, energy companies drill for gas trapped within the
rock, a byproduct of decomposed mud and organic material.4 Investment in natural gas has been a boom to the U.S. economy, and
energy companies are joining the revolution.5 To keep up with
strong industry growth prospects, energy companies are funding
more shale projects and increasing the size of their facilities to accommodate the increased production.6
One of the companies investing heavily in natural gas, Tennessee Gas Pipeline Company, LLC (Tennessee Gas), operates over a
13,900-mile pipeline infrastructure, transporting natural gas from
Louisiana, the Gulf of Mexico, and South Texas to the Northeast,
1. See Marcellus Shale Coalition, Marcellus Offers “Transformational” Opportunities for our Region, Nation (Sept. 4, 2014), http://marcelluscoalition.org/2014/09/
marcellus-offers-transformational-opportunities-for-our-region-nation/ (referencing statistical report for indication of production growth).
2. See id. (explaining role of fracking and shale expansion in natural gas production expansion).
3. See The Marcellus Shale, Explained, STATEIMPACT, http://stateimpact.npr.org
/pennsylvania/tag/marcellus-shale/ (last visited Oct. 14, 2014) (describing Marcellus formation).
4. See id. (explaining how shale gas is created and obtained).
5. See Marcellus Shale Coalition, supra note 1 (showing cause and effect of
natural gas production expansion). In the past five years, U.S. natural gas production has increased by 20%. Id.
6. See id. (explaining reaction to growing interest and demand for better facilities for natural gas production in United States).

(417)

Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2015

1

Villanova Environmental Law Journal, Vol. 26, Iss. 2 [2015], Art. 7

418 VILLANOVA ENVIRONMENTAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. XXVI: p. 417
including New York City and Boston.7 Tennessee Gas is a subsidiary
of Kinder Morgan, the fourth largest energy company in North
America.8 Tennessee Gas has served the Northeast for fifty years
and has upgraded several natural gas projects in the last decade,
which now carry shale gas from the Marcellus Formation to New
England and the Niagara Falls region.9 Progressive expansion of
production prompted Tennessee Gas to begin construction on the
Northeast Upgrade Project (NEUP).10 The 500 million dollar project would require expanding current lines in the area and cutting
new holes through undisturbed wooded areas around the Delaware
River Valley.11
Delaware Riverkeeper Network (DRN), a non-profit corporation established in 1988, and its associated members were not
pleased with the thought of tree-cutters rumbling through their
neighborhoods.12 Included in the suit was the current head of
DRN, known as the “Delaware Riverkeeper,” Maya Van Rossum,
who has been working at DRN since 1994 and has held her current
position since 1996.13 DRN “provides effective environmental advocacy, volunteer monitoring programs, stream restoration projects
7. See Tennessee Gas Pipeline, KINDER MORGAN, (2013), http://
www.kindermorgan.com/business/gas_pipelines/east/TGP/ (describing extent
and stretch of Tennessee Gas Pipeline and its operations).
8. See Tennessee Gas Pipeline-300 Line, KINDER MORGAN, (2013), http://
www.kindermorgan.com/business/gas_pipelines/east/TGP/300Line/ (discussing
Tennessee Gas’s corporate status and place in energy market).
9. See Northeast Supply Diversification, KINDER MORGAN (2013) http://
www.kindermorgan.com/business/gas_pipelines/east/TGP/NSD/ (describing
major natural gas pipeline in Northeast); see also Tennessee Gas Pipeline-300 Line,
supra note 8 (describing another major Tennessee Gas pipeline).
10. See Tennessee Gas Pipeline-Northeast Upgrade, KINDER MORGAN (2013) http://
www.kindermorgan.com/business/gas_pipelines/east/northeastupgrade/ (explaining impetus for expansion). The new pipeline would add 636,000
dekatherms per day of gas capacity to its existing production and join with Tennessee Gas’s other major lines. Id.
11. See id. (showing NEUP’s extent and cost of construction); see also Pipeline
appeal fails, cutting begins, THE PIKE COUNTY COURIER (Feb. 21, 2013, 6:01 AM),
available at http://pikecountycourier.com/apps/pbcs.dll/article?AID=/201302
21/NEWS01/130219956/Pipeline-appeal-fails-cutting-begins (reporting reaction
to wooded areas to be cut as part of project).
12. See Who We Are, DELAWARE RIVERKEEPER NETWORK, http://
www.delawareriverkeeper.org/about/whoweare.asp (last visited Oct. 14, 2014) (explaining DRN’s organization and mission statement). See generally Ongoing Issues,
DELAWARE RIVERKEEPER NETWORK, http://www.delawareriverkeeper.org/river-action/ongoing-issue-detail.aspx?Id=43 (last visited Oct. 14, 2014) (providing updates as to litigation involving DRN including current project).
13. The Delaware Riverkeeper, DELAWARE RIVERKEEPER NETWORK, http://
www.delawareriverkeeper.org/about/delawareriverkeeper.aspx (last visited Oct.
10, 2014) (describing role of Delaware Riverkeeper).
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and public education.”14 Historically, DRN does not shirk from
utilizing the courts to “ensure the enforcement of environmental
safety laws” relating to the Delaware River and its tributaries.15 As
the organization states, it is active in litigation because “[a] river has
no right to defend itself in a court of law.”16
DRN has appealed to the Environmental Hearing Board
(EHB) over a dozen times before, and recently appealed the Pennsylvania Department of Environmental Protection’s (PADEP) approval of permits for Tennessee Gas’s new project.17 The EHB
often handles cases in which concerned citizens attempt to protect
their lands from environmental threats, and the EHB tends to hold
firm as a remedial entity regarding PADEP’s decisions.18 Tennessee
Gas became weary of jumping through hoops and questioned the
EHB’s role in regulating interstate gas projects in light of federal
preemption concerns.19 In Delaware Riverkeeper Network v. Department
of Environmental Protection,20 the EHB, for the first time, rendered an
opinion to fight back against preemption claims and re-affirmed its
role as part of Pennsylvania’s state permit application procedures.21
This Note will discuss the facts and circumstances surrounding
Delaware Riverkeeper and its impact on Pennsylvania’s environmental
law regulatory procedure.22 Section II discusses the facts of the Delaware Riverkeeper appeal and the details of the natural gas projects in
question.23 Section III provides the legal, procedural, and substantive framework for the EHB’s decision.24 Section IV provides a nar14. Who We Are, supra note 12 (explaining DRN’s role in maintaining and protecting Delaware Water Gap).
15. Id. (explaining lack of fear in litigating claims).
16. Litigation, DELAWARE RIVERKEEPER NETWORK, http://www.delawareriver
keeper.org/river-action/litigation.aspx (last visited Oct. 10, 2014) (providing motivation for DRN’s mission statement as environmental watch group).
17. See generally, Delaware Riverkeeper Network v. Commonwealth, No. 2012196-M, 2013 WL 604393, at *1 (Pa. Envtl. Hearing Bd. Feb. 1, 2013)(explaining
impetus for DRN’s appeal).
18. See History of the Environmental Hearing Board, THE PENNSYLVANIA ENVIRONMENTAL HEARING BOARD, http://ehb.courtapps.com/content/ehb_history.php
(last visited Oct. 14, 2014) (discussing history of EHB and its role in Pennsylvania
environmental regulations).
19. See Delaware Riverkeeper, at *14-15 (discussing Tennessee Gas’s federal preemption arguments).
20. No. 2012-196-M, 2013 WL 604393.
21. See id. at *14-15 (holding EHB proceeding was not preempted).
22. For a comprehensive discussion of Delaware Riverkeeper and its impact, see
infra notes 27-211 and accompanying text.
23. For a discussion of the facts in Delaware Riverkeeper, see infra notes 27-51
and accompanying text.
24. For a discussion of the legal background of Delaware Riverkeeper, see infra
notes 52-150 and accompanying text.
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rative analysis of the decision, while Section V critically analyzes the
EHB’s final decision.25 Lastly, Section VI reflects on the impact of
the EHB’s decision and the future of the EHB in Pennsylvania’s
burgeoning gas industry.26
II. NEUP COMES

TO THE

DELAWARE

DRN’s appeal to the EHB followed PADEP’s approval of three
permits for Tennessee Gas to construct the NEUP across Northeastern Pennsylvania and New Jersey.27 PADEP granted Tennessee Gas
the permits pursuant to an order from the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC).28 FERC directed that the state permits
must be consistent with the order; additionally, even though the
states should work closely with Tennessee Gas, the states could not
“prohibit or unreasonably delay the construction . . . approved by
[FERC].”29 Furthermore, FERC explained its assessment was conditional on Tennessee Gas’s understanding that the company had to
comply with other federal and state agencies as part of its environmental mitigation measures.30 Under this directive, Tennessee Gas
began preparing for the construction of the pipeline.31
NEUP called for the construction of approximately forty miles
of thirty-inch diameter pipeline, in addition to the existing compressor and meter stations located in Pennsylvania and New
Jersey.32 In Pennsylvania, the pipeline would stretch twenty-two
miles through Bradford, Susquehanna, Wayne, and Pike Coun25. For a discussion of the EHB’s analysis and its criticisms, see infra notes
150-200 and accompanying text.
26. For a discussion of the possible impact of Delaware Riverkeeper, see infra
notes 201-11 and accompanying text.
27. Delaware Riverkeeper Network v. Commonwealth, No. 2012-196-M, 2013
WL 604393, at *1 (Pa. Envtl. Hearing Bd. Feb. 1, 2013)(discussing approval of
permits).
28. See id. at *14 (discussing directive of FERC to Tennessee Gas to obtain
permits). FERC issued the order after nearly two years of environmental review,
producing a length environmental assessment. See Tennessee Gas Pipeline Co.’s
Mot. Dismiss at ¶¶ 14-15 (summarizing FERC’s review of the project).
29. See Tennessee Gas Pipeline Co., L.L.C., 139 FERC ¶ 61161, ¶202 (May 29,
2012) (encouraging cooperation between state review and Tennessee Gas).
30. Id. at ¶ 200 (explaining FERC’s acknowledgment that other measures
were to be taken under state regulation).
31. See Tennessee Gas Pipeline Company, L.L.C., Docket No. CP11-161-000, 142
¶FERC 61,025 (issuing Notice to Proceed with pipeline preparations). On June
28, 2012, the DRN and others filed a Request for Rehearing. Id. On December 14,
2012, while the request was pending, FERC issued a Notice to Proceed, allowing
construction to begin. Id.
32. Delaware Riverkeeper, 2013 WL 604393, at *1 (describing upgrades to pipeline under new project plans).
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ties.33 The project would run along an existing right of way except
for a 3.4-mile segment in Pike County.34 The new right of way was
required to avoid the Delaware Water Gap National Recreational
Area under the jurisdiction of the National Park Service.35
The first permit DRN appealed was an Erosion and Sedimentation Control General Permit for Earth Disturbance Associated with
Oil and Gas Exploration, Production, Processing or Treatment Operations or Transmission Facilities (ESCGP-1) under Chapter 102
of the Pennsylvania Code.36 The remaining two permits challenged
were water obstruction and encroachments permits under Chapter
105 of the Pennsylvania Code for activities in Wayne and Pike
Counties.37 In evaluating the proposed project, PADEP consulted
the County Conservation Districts of each of the four counties
through which the pipeline would cross.38 PADEP thus coordinated its efforts with the counties and with Tennessee Gas to determine technical deficiencies in the project, sending many of the
comments from the counties to Tennessee Gas.39 PADEP conducted several technical reviews, incorporating comments from several counties.40 While PADEP incorporated many of Pike County’s
concerns, they also disagreed with other comments made during
this phase; however, they ultimately approved the project.41
In response, DRN, Maya Van Rossum, and RDA filed for a
Temporary Supersedeas and a Petition for Supersedeas to enjoin
Tennessee Gas from continuing its operation in Pike County.42 As
a result, Tennessee Gas filed its Response to DRN’s petition along
with a Motion to Dismiss asserting the federal law preempted the
33. Id. (describing location of pipeline).
34. Id. (explaining new right of way in Pike County).
35. Id. (explaining why new right of way was required).
36. Id. (naming first permit obtained). ESCGP-1 covered the entire length of
the NEUP in Pennsylvania. Id.
37. Delaware Riverkeeper, 2013 WL 604393, at *1 (naming other permits obtained). For further discussion of Pennsylvania permit procedure see infra notes
72-79 and accompanying text. One water permit in Wayne County covered twentyseven wetland and sixteen stream crossings; the other permit in Pike County covered fifty-eight wetland and thirty-one stream crossings. Delaware Riverkeeper, 2013
WL 604393, at *1.
38. Delaware Riverkeeper, 2013 WL 604393, at *4 (noting Pike County’s role in
evaluation).
39. Id. (explaining objective of Pike County correspondence).
40. Id. (noting use of Pike County comments in review letters).
41. Id. at *5 (expressing disagreement with Pike County’s evaluation). The
only county of the four involved that continued to file complaints for alleged deficiencies after the first review was Pike County. Id.
42. Id. at *2 (discussing legal actions by appellants). For a discussion of Petitions of Supersedeas, see infra notes 87-92 and accompanying text.
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EHB and the EHB was without jurisdiction.43 Tennessee Gas maintained the EHB hearing was preempted by FERC’s granting of a
Certificate of Public Convenience and Necessity.44 The company
also argued the Natural Gas Act (NGA) established specific procedures for environmental review of interstate natural gas projects,
which did not permit EHB review.45 Thus, Tennessee Gas filed a
separate suit in the Middle District of Pennsylvania to enjoin the
EHB from conducting the Supersedeas hearing.46 The EHB acknowledged Tennessee Gas’s motion and filed a parallel judicial
appeal to the district court, specifying that neither the NGA nor
FERC preempted the EHB proceeding.47 The EHB ultimately denied Tennessee Gas’s Motion to Dismiss, but still denied DRN’s Petition for Supersedeas because DRN failed to show it would likely
succeed on the merits or that DRN would suffer irreparable harm.48
III. THE HURDLES OF THE FEDERAL AND STATE NATURAL GAS
REGULATORY PARTNERSHIP
Tennessee Gas supported its claim that the EHB lacked authority to hear DRN’s appeals based on constitutional principles and
precedent.49 While FERC directed Tennessee Gas to work with
state agencies, and required certain conditions pursuant to such local permits, it was unclear to which state body FERC was directing
its order: PADEP or the EHB.50 The following sections of this Note
will track the development of the relevant legal standards addressed
in Delaware Riverkeeper as well as the related federal court
jurisprudence.51

43. Delaware Riverkeeper, 2013 WL 604393, at *2 (discussing Tennessee Gas’s
response to DRN’s petition).
44. Id. at *14 (discussing legal basis for Tennessee Gas’s preemption argument). For a discussion of FERC procedures, see infra notes 58-61.
45. See Delaware Riverkeeper, 2013 WL 604393, at *14 (addressing Tennessee
Gas’s secondary argument for motion to dismiss).
46. Id. at *2 (explaining Tennessee Gas’s basis for motion to dismiss).
47. See id. at *25-28 (denying Tennessee Gas’s motion to dismiss on federal
preemption).
48. Id. at *1 (denying Petition for Supersedeas).
49. See generally Tennessee Gas Pipeline Company LLC’s Mot. Dismiss, at 2-21
(arguing EHB proceeding is preempted by federal law).
50. See generally Tennessee Gas Pipeline Co., L.L.C., 139 FERC ¶ 61161, ¶202
(May 29, 2012) (encouraging state involvement in federal projects).
51. For a further discussion of the relevant legal standards, see supra notes 52150 and accompanying text.
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A. Federal Preemption
The Supremacy Clause in the United States Constitution declares the law of the Federal Government supreme to those of the
states.52 Accordingly, a state law that “interferes with, or is contrary
to federal law is invalid.”53 Federal preemption applies in three major situations: (1) express preemption, (2) field preemption, and
(3) conflict preemption.54 Express preemption applies when Congress expressly intends to preempt state law.55 Field preemption
applies when Congress’s intent to preempt all state law in a particular area may be inferred because the scheme of federal regulation is
sufficiently comprehensive.56 Field preemption may be inferred
where the “federal interest is so dominant that the federal system
will be assumed to preclude enforcement of state law on the same
subject.”57 Lastly, conflict preemption applies when state law is nullified to the extent that it actually conflicts with federal law, even
though Congress has not displaced all state law in a given area.58
Moreover, a conflict between state and federal law exists when compliance with both federal and state regulations is a “physical impossibility” or when state law hinders “the full purposes and objectives
of Congress.”59
B. FERC and the Natural Gas Act
FERC is an independent agency that regulates interstate transmission of electricity, natural gas, and oil.60 The NGA also grants
FERC exclusive jurisdiction and reviewing power over natural gas
52. See U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2 (declaring law of United States supreme law).
53. Farina v. Nokia, 578 F. Supp. 2d 740, 754 (E.D. Pa. 2008) (quoting Free v.
Bland, 369 U.S. 663 (1962)) (explaining relationship between conflicting state and
federal laws).
54. Id. (explaining three types of preemption); see also Northern Natural Gas
Co. v. Iowa Utils. Bd., 377 F.3d 817, 821 (8th Cir. 2004) (providing overview of
three applications of federal preemption).
55. See id. (quoting Hillsborough Cnty. v. Automated Med. Labs., Inc., 471
U.S. 707, 713 (1985)) (describing express preemption).
56. See id. (discussing preemption when Congress intends federal government
to occupy field).
57. Id. (discussing effect of implied field preemption).
58. Farina, 578 F. Supp. 2d at 754 (discussing conflict preemption).
59. Id. (citing Colacicco v. Apotex Inc., 521 F.3d 253, 265 (3d Cir. 2008))
(explaining nuances in conflict preemption). Generally, federal courts cannot enjoin state administrative proceedings unless expressly authorized by an Act of Congress, or where necessary in aid of its jurisdiction, or to protect or effectuate its
judgments. 28 U.S.C. § 2283 (2012) (explaining exceptions to general rule
prohibiting injunction of state proceedings).
60. See What FERC Does, FERC (Jun. 24, 2014), http://www.ferc.gov/about/
ferc-does.asp (providing overview of responsibilities of FERC).
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projects.61 FERC grants Certificates of Public Convenience and Necessity allowing natural gas projects only when it finds the applicant
is “willing and able” to comply with federal regulations, and may
attach certain conditions and requirements to any Certificate as it
deems necessary.62 In reviewing an application for a Certificate,
FERC must ensure the project complies with the requirements of
all relevant federal laws, including the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) and the Clean Water Act (CWA).63
If a party disagrees with a FERC action, it may apply for a rehearing within thirty days of the order, at which time FERC may
grant or deny a rehearing or modify its order without another proceeding.64 The Energy Policy Act of 2005 (EPACT) amended the
NGA to provide a forum for review of such orders.65 The amendment provides that:
The United States Court of Appeals for the circuit in
which a facility . . . is proposed to be constructed, expanded, or operated shall have original and exclusive jurisdiction over any civil action for the review of an order
or action of a . . . State administrative agency acting pursuant to Federal law to issue, condition, or deny any permit,
license, concurrence, or approval . . . required under Federal law . . . .66
61. See 15 U.S.C. § 717f(c)(1)(A) (2012) (granting FERC jurisdiction of interstate natural gas companies). The statute reads:
No natural-gas company . . . upon completion of any proposed construction . . . shall engage in the transportation or sale of natural gas, subject
to the jurisdiction of [FERC] . . . unless there is in force with respect to
such natural-gas company a certificate of public convenience and necessity issued by the [FERC] authorizing such acts or operation . . . .”
Id. See also Schneidewind v. ANR Pipeline Co., 485 U.S. 293, 300-01 (1988) (discussing function of NGA).
62. See 15 U.S.C. § 717f(e) (2012) (explaining requirements to receive and
comply with certificate); see also Northern Natural Gas Co. v. Iowa Utils. Bd., 377
F.3d 817, 821 (8th Cir. 2004) (discussing NGA’s authorization of FERC). One of
the benefits of Certificate approval is the authority to obtain rights of way through
eminent domain under the authority of the government. See 15 U.S.C. § 717f(h)
(2012) (authorizing use of eminent domain in case of inability to negotiate land
transfer or sale)
63. See Tennessee Gas Pipeline Co.’s Mot. Dismiss, No. 2012-196-M, 2 (discussing FERC requirements to issue Certificate of Public Necessity).
64. See 15 U.S.C. § 717r(a) (2012) (describing rehearing procedure for appealed FERC order); see also Delaware Riverkeeper Network v. Federal Energy Regulatory Comm’n, 753 F.3d 1304, 1307 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (hearing appeal of FERC
rehearing decision).
65. See 15 U.S.C. § 717r (2012) (enacting rehearing and review of FERC-regulated decisions).
66. 15 U.S.C. 717r(d)(1) (2012) (granting exclusive jurisdiction to circuit
courts for reviews of construction of interstate gas facilities).
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If an order is contradictory to federal law governing one of the
permits and would prevent construction of a FERC-authorized project, the appeals court will remand the order to the state agency,
which must take action consistent with the appeals court’s
holdings.67
C. The Clean Water Act
Although the conditions of the NGA apply generally to natural
gas projects, such projects must meet additional requirements
under the CWA.68 According to the NGA, “[N]othing in [the
NGA] affects the rights of States under . . . the [CWA].”69 The
CWA adds, “Any applicant for a Federal license or permit to conduct any activity including . . . the construction . . . of facilities,
which may result in any discharge into navigable waters, shall provide . . . a certification from the State in which the discharge
originates or will originate . . . .”70
The Supreme Court stated in Arkansas v. Oklahoma71 that the
CWA “anticipates a partnership between the States and the Federal
Government.”72 Furthermore, the Second Circuit has held “the
Clean Water Act . . . [is] notable in effecting a federal-state partnership to ensure water quality . . . so that state standards approved by
the federal government become the federal standard for that
state.”73 Thus, the NGA and CWA require applicants to receive certification from states showing compliance with local regulations
when applying to federal agencies, such as FERC.74

67. See id. at § 717r(d)(3) (describing judicial review of state agency
procedure).
68. See Tennessee Gas Pipeline Co. v. Delaware Riverkeeper Network, 921 F.
Supp. 2d 381, 386 (M.D. Pa. 2013) (explaining exceptions in NGA pursuant to
provision in CWA).
69. 15 U.S.C. § 717b(d)(3) (2012) (providing exceptions to NGA pursuant
CWA).
70. 33 U.S.C. § 1341(a)(1) (2012) (granting states power to regulate and certify local permits).
71. 503 U.S. 91 (1992).
72. Id. at 101 (discussing cooperation of state and federal regulations with
regard to CWA).
73. Islander E. Pipeline Co. v. McCarthy, 525 F.3d 141, 143 (2d Cir. 2008)
(noting overlap in state and federal standards for water quality).
74. See id. at 144 (explaining co-regulatory scheme between NGA and CWA);
see also Dominion Transmission, Inc. v. Town of Myersville Town Council, 982 F.
Supp. 2d 570, 577 (D. Md. 2013) (holding local regulations not preempted under
NGA when enacted under CWA).
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D. PA State Permit Procedures
FERC required Tennessee Gas to obtain the necessary state
permits from PADEP.75 Pennsylvania’s permit review process requires applicants to provide complete and technically adequate applications.76 An application is complete if it “contains the necessary
information, maps, fees, and other documents, and [ ]these items
are of sufficient detail for Technical Review of the application” including addressing regulatory and statutory requirements.77 Complete applications subsequently undergo a Technical Review to
determine if they contain the necessary scientific and engineering
information and a project design addressing specific regulatory
requirements.78
When a project fails to meet certain regulatory requirements,
PADEP responds with a technical deficiency letter, which cites the
statute or regulation that the application fails to address sufficiently.79 Applications that pass this test are approved within a
guaranteed number of business days.80 A water obstruction permit
must comply with Chapter 105 of the Pennsylvania Code and Section 401 of the CWA.81 Obtaining a permit also requires compliance with Chapter 102 and the procurement of an ESCGP permit.82

75. See Tennessee Gas Pipeline Co., L.L.C., 139 FERC ¶ 61161 ¶ 53, 71, 76, 78,
82, 147, 171, 172, and 175 (May 29, 2012) (requiring state and local approval for
compliance with federal standards).
76. See DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION, Policy for Implementing the
Department of Environmental Protection (Department) Permit Review Process and Permit
Decision Guarantee, 5 (Nov. 2, 2012), available at, http://files.dep.state.pa.us/Pro
gramIntegration/PermitDecisionGuaranteePortalFiles/021-2100-001_PRP_and_
PDG_Policy.pdf (describing applicant accountabilities through PADEP procedure). PADEP also encourages all applicants to hold pre-application conferences
with PADEP to discuss possible issues, especially for large multi-permit projects. Id.
at 5, 7.
77. Id. at 8 (explaining details of completeness review).
78. Id. at 10 (describing next step in permit process).
79. Id. at 11 (explaining procedure if project is technically deficient).
80. See id. at 13 (explaining final step in permit procedure). Applicants who
fail to address the technical deficiencies are subject to Elevated Review, which includes face-to-face meetings and telephone calls with Department directors to determine the direction of the project and if permit will be denied. Id. at 12; see
generally id. at 15-25 (providing guaranteed permit decision timeframes).
81. See generally 25 P.S.C.A. §§ 105.11-.15 (Supp. 2011) (providing state regulatory application requirements for water obstruction permits); see also 33 U.S.C.
§ 1341(a)(1) (2012) (requiring compliance with state regulations to comply with
federal regulations).
82. 25 P.S.C.A. § 105.14(b)(11) (Supp. 2011) (requiring compliance with
Chapter 102 as factor in review of application under Chapter 105).
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E. The Environmental Hearing Board
Disgruntled citizens may appeal approved permits to the EHB,
a Pennsylvania-created independent “quasi-judicial” agency consisting of five attorneys with experience before administrative agencies.83 The EHB has the power to hear appeals from PADEP
orders.84 Although PADEP may take action on its orders prior to
an EHB review, “[N]o action of [PADEP] adversely affecting a person shall be final as to that person until the person has had the
opportunity to appeal the action to the board . . . .”85 The EHB
must conduct a de novo review of the action.86 Furthermore, the
EHB is not limited in determining whether evidence based only on
facts found by the PADEP supports the PADEP’s action.87 Instead,
“the EHB’s duty [is] to determine if [PADEP’s] action can be sustained or supported by the evidence taken by the EHB.”88 EHB
decisions can be appealed to the Pennsylvania Commonwealth
Court, which is not bound by EHB precedent.89
F. Petitions for Supersedeas
A Petition for Supersedeas may be filed at any time during a
proceeding.90 Moreover, a petitioner may file a Temporary Supersedeas when there is a likelihood that a party might suffer immediate and irreparable injury before the EHB can conduct a hearing

83. 35 P.S.C.A. § 7513(a), (b), (e) (Supp. 2000) (explaining structure of EHB
and qualifications of its members).
84. See 35 P.S.C.A. § 7514(a) (Supp. 2000) (empowering EHB with ability to
hear appeals).
85. See id. at § 7514(c) (declaring no action of PADEP final until person can
appeal to EHB).
86. Pennsylvania Trout v. Department of Envtl. Prot., 863 A.2d 93, 106 (Pa.
Commw. Ct. 2004) (citing Warren Sand & Gravel Co. v. Commonwealth, 341 A.2d
556, 565 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1975)) (explaining level of review).
87. Id. (discussing records allowed to be considered in evidence by EHB).
88. Id. (explaining EHB’s duty to determine basis for PADEP decision from
its own collection of evidence).
89. See Tire Jockey Serv., Inc. v. Commonwealth, 915 A.2d 1165, 1178 (Pa.
2007) (discussing appeal of EHB decision to Commonwealth Court); see also Pennsylvania Trout, 863 A.2d at 106 (explaining that EHB decisions are not binding on
Commonwealth Court).
90. 25 P.S.C.A. § 1021.61(a) (describing permissible timing of Supersedeas
petitions). An appeal does not in itself act as a Supersedeas, but a Petition for
Supersedeas must be heard by the EHB. Id. See also 35 P.S.C.A. § 7514(d)(1)
(Supp. 2000) (explaining procedure of Supersedeas petition).
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on a Petition for Supersedeas.91 The EHB takes into account relevant precedent when evaluating the merits for Supersedeas.92
The EHB considers three factors in its analysis to determine if
it can grant a Petition for Supersedeas: (1) irreparable harm to the
petitioner, (2) the likelihood of the petitioner prevailing on the
merits, and (3) the likelihood of injury to the public or other parties, such as the permittee in third party appeals.93 For the EHB to
grant a Supersedeas, a petitioner must make a credible showing on
each of the three regulatory criteria.94 If a petitioner does not meet
one of the three factors, the Board “need not consider the remaining requirements for Supersedeas relief.”95
G. Permit Preemption in the Courts
1. The Third Circuit’s Last Foray: NE Hub Partners
The Third Circuit previously discussed how to address the
questions of authority present between state and federal regulatory
procedures.96 In NE Hub Partners, L.P. v. CNG Transmission Corporation, a natural gas company planned to construct a natural gas storage facility for use in interstate commerce.97 As a result, the project
was subject to FERC’s jurisdiction and required FERC to “exhaustively review . . . [the] proposal for the Facility” and conduct an
Environmental Impact Assessment pursuant to NEPA.98 After review, FERC issued a Certificate of Public Convenience and Necessity to the natural gas company.99
Pursuant to the Certificate, FERC required the gas company to
comply with Pennsylvania’s drilling regulations and authorized the
state to regulate the project for environmental safety.100 Despite
91. 25 P.S.C.A. § 1021.64(a) (explaining function of Temporary Supersedeas).
92. 25 P.S.C.A. § 1021.63(a) (explaining weight of judicial precedent in EHB
Supersedeas proceedings).
93. Id. (enumerating three requirements of successful Supersedeas claim).
94. See Neubert v. Department of Envtl. Prot., No. 2005-103-R, 2005 WL
3872388, at *2 (Pa. Envtl. Hearing Bd. July 15, 2005)(holding necessity to find
credible showing for all three requirements).
95. Oley Twp v. Department of Envtl. Prot., No. 96-198-MG, 1996 WL 66064,
at *6 (Pa. Envtl. Hearing Bd. Nov. 6, 1996)(holding petitioner must show all three
factors for Petition for Supersedeas).
96. See NE Hub Partners, L.P. v. CNG Transmission Corp., 239 F.3d 333, 34549 (3d Cir. 2001) (holding FERC order could preempt state proceedings).
97. See id. at 337 (describing gas company’s project).
98. Id. at 337-38 (explaining required procedures for interstate commerce
project).
99. See id. at 339 (explaining factual background of FERC involvement).
100. See id. (discussing order given to gas company).
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the apparent delegation of regulatory power to the state, the Certificate qualified FERC’s instruction by adding language stating that
state agencies could not “prohibit or unreasonably delay” the project.101 The gas company thus successfully applied for the necessary
permits from PADEP.102 In response, the gas company’s competitors appealed to the EHB protesting the permits obtained from
PADEP.103
Having already spent four years seeking approval for its project, the gas company filed a complaint in the district court, arguing
that the review was preempted and caused unreasonable delay.104
The company’s preemption claims were (1) the Certificate preempted the EHB proceeding and (2) the company was “completely
free from any state regulation.”105 The district court dismissed the
case for lack of ripeness, because the EHB had not yet taken action
against the gas company.106 The Third Circuit ultimately reversed
the district court’s decision, and rejected the dismissal.107
The Third Circuit stated that it “strongly doubted” the case did
not involve field preemption, and suggested the district court reconsider its decision on remand.108 In a footnote, the Third Circuit
mentioned that the conflicting language in the Certificate created a
“hybrid situation” that “effectively . . . converted the case into a conflict preemption matter.”109 In the main text, however, the court
stated preemption of the proceeding does not only apply to field
preemption cases, but rather “it is logical to preempt state process
concerning such matters as state actions in occupied fields” when
101. NE Hub Partners, 239 F.3d at 339 (qualifying FERC’s state authorization);
see also Tennessee Gas Pipeline Co., L.L.C., 139 FERC ¶ 61161, at ¶95 (explaining
limits to state regulation akin to language in NE Hub Partners).
102. See NE Hub Partners, (explaining successful application to state authority
by gas company).
103. See id. (showing competitors’ response to granted permits).
104. See id. (providing procedural posture and NE Hub’s arguments); see also
Tennessee Gas Pipeline Co., L.L.C., supra note 29 and accompanying text (reiterating
FERC’s unreasonable delay provision).
105. See NE Hub Partners, 239 F.3d at 340 (providing two theories of
preemption).
106. See id. (discussing district court’s ruling in favor of EHB).
107. See id. at 349 (discussing Third Circuit’s reversal of district court). The
Third Circuit discussed preemption in-depth, but ultimately did not rule on the
issue.
108. Id. (disagreeing with district court’s holding that case did not involve
field preemption).
109. Id. at 346 n. 13 (discussing preemption that regulates in field but permits
state regulation). The gas company only argued the EHB’s review was preempted
on thirty identified issues already addressed in the FERC proceedings. Id. at 345.
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state processes conflict with federal regulatory laws.110 The court
held that “state regulatory processes could be preempted by conflict
with federal law, as well as field occupation.”111 Furthermore, it
would “defy logic to hold that a process which would ultimately conflict with federal law would itself be preempted.”112 While the court
suggested that the EHB process could be preempted, it left the ultimate decision to the district court on remand.113
2. The Supreme Court Addresses NGA Field Preemption in
Schneidewind
The U.S. Supreme Court’s most recent discussion of concurrent regulation of interstate natural gas companies has been repeatedly cited in subsequent litigation.114 In Schneidewind v. ANR
Pipeline Co., a Michigan statute required approval of a state commission for natural gas companies to issue long-term securities.115 The
Court stated that the NGA gives FERC exclusive jurisdiction over
“the transportation and sale of natural gas in interstate commerce”
and “FERC exercises authority over the rates and facilities of natural gas companies used in this transportation and sale,” including
the regulation of securities.116 The Court held that the Michigan
statute was an attempt to regulate in a field occupied by federal
regulation through the NGA, and the objectives of the state coin110. See NE Hub Partners, 239 F.3d at 347 (finding preemption process not
confined to field preemption cases).
111. Id. at 348 (holding state regulatory process can be preempted by either
conflict preemption or field occupation).
112. Id. (holding it would be illogical not to find processes in conflict with
federal law preempted).
113. Id. at 348-49 (forgoing concluding EHB process is itself preempted).
The Third Circuit stressed that the opinion should not be “overread” to mean they
were holding the EHB proceeding preempted, but rather that in the right set of
circumstances, the proceeding could be. Id. at 349 n. 18.
114. See Schneidewind v. ANR Pipeline Co., 485 U.S. 293, 311 (1988) (holding regulation promulgated by Michigan statute preempted by NGA). See also Rockies Express Pipeline v. Indiana State Natural Res. Comm’n, 2010 WL 3882513, at
*3 (S.D. Ind.) (citing Schneidewind in its reasoning for finding FERC’s exclusive
jurisdiction over natural gas in interstate commerce). For a discussion of Rockies
Express, see infra notes 117-23 and accompanying text. See also Natural Fuel Gas
Supply Corp. v. Public Serv Comm’n of N.Y., 894 F.2d 571, 576, (2d Cir. 1990)
(finding Scheidewind as weighing heavily in favor of preemption); Northern Natural
Gas. Co. v. Iowa Utils. Bd., 377 F.3d 817, 821 (8th Cir. 2004) (holding NGA occupies field of natural gas regulation following reasoning in Schneidewind).
115. See Scheidewind, 485 U.S. at 295-97 (discussing factual background of
case). Michigan’s Public Utilities Securities Act (“Act 144”) directed the Michigan
Public Service Commission to approve the issuance of securities of natural gas
transporters. Id. at 296-98.
116. Id. at 300-01 (discussing NGA’s grant of jurisdiction in FERC and FERC’s
subsequent powers).
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cided with the objectives of FERC.117 Further, the Court found this
was a case where a state law impermissibly tried to regulate in an
area Congress intended FERC to regulate.118 In holding that the
statute was preempted, the Court added the state law may be preempted even though “collision between the state and federal regulation may not be an inevitable consequence.”119
3. Rockies Express Preempts Review of State Permits by State
Agency
The Southern District of Indiana has previously ruled on behalf of a natural gas company on preemption grounds.120 In Rockies
Express Pipeline, LLC v. Indiana State Natural Resources Commission, a
natural gas company received a Certificate of Public Convenience
and Necessity from FERC and obtained the state permits authorizing construction of a pipeline from the Indiana Department of Natural Resources (DNR).121 One of the company’s competitors
challenged the permit and appealed to the Indiana State Natural
Resources Commission (NRC).122 During the pending action,
FERC released the gas company to begin construction of the pipeline, and the company sought a declaratory judgment finding the
appeals proceeding had been preempted.123
The court determined that although FERC encouraged state
participation in the permit process, FERC “does not negate its ultimate authority to determine the route of any gas pipeline regardless of state objections.”124 The court suggested that not all
proceedings would be preempted if they did not conflict with
FERC, but that revocation of a construction permit was not a per117. Id. at 307 (holding Michigan statute regulated in same field as NGA).
118. Id. at 308-09 (summarizing why statute coincides with FERC jurisdiction).
119. Id. at 310-11 (internal quotations omitted)(holding state regulation does
not have to directly conflict with federal regulation for preemption). The Court
determined that “this ‘imminent possibility’ further demonstrates the NGA’s complete occupation of the field Act 144 seeks to regulate.” Id.
120. Rockies Express Pipeline v. Indiana State Natural Res. Comm’n, 2010
WL 3882513, at *6 (S.D. Ind.) (holding Indiana administrative review of permit
preempted by FERC).
121. See id. at *1 (describing factual background of case). The FERC certificate encouraged cooperation between the states and the interstate pipelines but
states “may [not] prohibit or unreasonably delay the construction or operation of
facilities approved by this commission.” Id. at *2.
122. Id. at *1 (explaining appeals procedure to NRC).
123. Id. at *2 (providing procedural posture of action of case).
124. Id. at *4 (discussing FERC’s ultimate authority over permit procedures).
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missible state involvement in FERC jurisdiction.125 The court concluded that “no matter what label [parties] affix or term of art
[parties] use . . . , it is the FERC, with review by the federal courts,
and not the DNR or NRC that has the final word here.”126
4. The Second and Fourth Circuits Apply the CWA
Although Schneidewind and its subsequent cases indicated the
NGA generally preempts the field of interstate natural gas regulation, the Second and Fourth Circuits analyzed the effect of the
CWA on this area of preemption.127 In Islander East Pipeline Co.,
LLC v. Connecticut Dep’t. of Envtl. Protection, the natural gas company
sought to construct an interstate pipeline from Connecticut to New
York and appealed the state agency’s denial of its petition to construct the pipeline to the Second Circuit.128 The Second Circuit
determined the case involved the review of a state agency pursuant
to an amendment to the NGA as a result of EPACT.129 Citing the
“limited legislative history” of EPACT, the court found the purpose
of EPACT was to help companies like Islander East pass their
projects through a streamlined process for necessary construction.130 The court stated that Congress preempted the area of interstate natural gas through the NGA, but left room for state
regulation through the CWA as “deputized regulators.”131 The
court determined that the state agency had committed to the NGA
and CWA regulatory scheme and pursuant to EPACT, could have
its actions reviewed by the federal courts.132 The Second Circuit
125. Rockies Express, 2010 WL 3882513, at *5 (holding federal preemption applies to quasi-judicial proceedings). At the time the decision was rendered, the
company had already finished construction of the pipeline. Id. at *2.
126. Id. at *6 (confirming FERC’s exclusive jurisdiction on interstate natural
gas matters).
127. See generally Islander E. Pipeline Co. v. Connecticut Dep’t. of Envtl. Protection, 482 F.3d 79, 81-91 (2d Cir. 2006) (discussing jurisdiction of CWA certifications in federal courts); AES Sparrows Point LNG, LLC v. Wilson, 589 F.3d 721,
723-33 (4th Cir. 2009) (discussing NWA/CWA co-regulatory scheme).
128. Islander, 482 F.3d at 83 (describing interstate natural gas pipeline pertaining to case at hand).
129. Id. (discussing nature of case). For a discussion of EPACT, see supra
notes 65-67 and accompanying text.
130. Islander, 482 F.3d at 85 (discussing limited legislative history of EPACT).
Furthermore, “NGA applicants were subject to ‘a series of sequential administrative and State court and Federal court appeals that [could] kill a [project with a
death by a thousand cuts . . . .’” Id.
131. Id. at 90 (describing extent of federal preemption in interstate natural
gas and exceptions).
132. Id. at 91 (holding state agency under review of federal courts).
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reaffirmed this federal-state partnership when the case returned
two years later.133
The Fourth Circuit also reviewed the denial of a petition pursuant to a FERC order in AES Sparrows Point LNG v. Wilson134 and
through such action, implicitly assumed that the Circuit Courts
have jurisdiction in such petitions.135 In its denial of the original
petition, the Maryland state agency specifically instructed the natural gas company to petition the Fourth Circuit to review the decision.136 Thus, the Fourth Circuit analyzed the state agency’s order
directly pursuant to its CWA certifications without any further appeals to another reviewing board or to obtain a separate state judicial determination.137
5. The Middle District Strikes a Blow to the EHB
The Middle District Court of Pennsylvania, days after the
EHB’s opinion in Delaware Riverkeeper, granted Tennessee Gas’s Motion to Dismiss.138 While admitting that the NGA generally
preempts state review of permits pursuant to the NGA or FERC order, the court held that PADEP’s permitting process was not preempted by the NGA because of the provisions in the CWA requiring
state water quality certifications.139 The case instead turned on the
plain language and legislative history of Section 717r of the NGA
regarding the jurisdiction of DRN’s claim against FERC.140 The
court determined that the “state administrative agency acting pur133. See Islander E. Pipeline Co. v. McCarthy, 525 F.3d 141, 143 (2d Cir.
2008)(discussing federal-state partnership in NGA).
134. 589 F.3d 721 (4th Cir. 2009).
135. AES Sparrows Point LNG, LLC v. Wilson, 589 F.3d 721, 723-33 (4th Cir.
2009) (confirming circuit court exclusive jurisdiction for NGA claims).
136. See id. at 727 (describing notice of state review agency to gas company).
137. See id. (bypassing any state review agency or state court).
138. See Tennessee Gas Pipeline Co. v. Delaware Riverkeeper Network, 921 F.
Supp. 2d 381, 383 (M.D. Pa. 2013) (holding PADEP permitting process allowed
but EHB review precluded by FERC order).
139. See id. at 385-86 (citing Schneidewind v. ANR Pipeline Co., 485 U.S. 293,
305 (1988)) (explaining holding does not depend on preemption of state procedures due to provisions of CWA); see also Northern Natural Gas Co., v Iowa Utils.
Bd., 377 F.3d 817, 823 (8th Cir. 2004); Natural Fuel Gas Supply Corp. v. Public
Serv. Comm’n of N.Y., 894 F.2d 571, 579, (2d Cir. 1990); NE Hub Partners, L.P. v.
CNG Transmission Corp., 239 F.3d 333, 348 (3d Cir. 2001). For further discussion
of the CWA and its relationship to the NGA, see supra notes 68-74.
140. Tennessee Gas, 921 F. Supp. 2d at 388 (holding Section 717r precludes
appellate review of EHB). While DRN argued that only the Chapter 105 permits
were subject to federal jurisdiction under the CWA, the court determined the
ESCGP permits were part and parcel with the Chapter 105 permits. Id. at 387.
Therefore, the all of the permits granted by the Department were under appeal.
Id.
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suant to Federal law” whose order would be reviewed referred only
to PADEP and not the EHB.141 In contrast, the EHB existed pursuant solely to state law, as opposed to a federal statute.142 The court
disagreed with DRN that the EHB protects a constitutional due process right because Section 717r(d)(1) does not contemplate finality
in the state action for the review of an order by the appeals court.143
The court also found the legislative history and precedent weighed
in favor of Tennessee Gas.144 The court discussed holdings by the
Second and Fourth Circuits that suggested that an order from a
PADEP-like agency could be directly appealed to the Circuit
Courts.145 Thus, the court held the NGA granted exclusive jurisdiction of these matters to the United States Court of Appeals.146
III. NARRATIVE ANALYSIS
The EHB denied DRN’s Petition for Supersedeas, but did so
on grounds other than federal preemption.147 Instead, the EHB
found DRN “failed to show that they were likely to succeed on the
merits or that they would suffer irreparable harm,” and as such, did
not fulfill the requirements for a successful Supersedeas petition.148
The EHB’s opinion discussed the preemption issue, but only after
the case had been decided on other grounds.149
141. See id. at 388-92 (examining plain language and legislative history of provision). The court determined that the EHB was not an agency acting pursuant to
the federal law, and that it could be more accurately described as a quasi-judicial
branch to the state administrative structure. Id. at 388-90.
142. Id. at 390 (drawing distinction between PADEP and EHB).
143. Id. at 391 (holding federal judicial review not barred because of lack of
finality in agency decisions). The court concluded that if Congress had intended
to require a finality requirement, Congress would have specified in the need for
one in the NGA. Id.
144. See generally id. at 391-93 (finding legislative history and precedent in
favor of Tennessee Gas)
145. Tennessee Gas, 921 F. Supp. 2d at 393 (discussing appeal potential); see
Islander E. Pipeline Co. v. Connecticut Dep’t. of Envt. Prot., 482 F.3d 79, 131-33;
AES Sparrows Point LNG v. Wilson, 589 F.3d 721, 723-33 (4th Cir. 2009) (affirming federal jurisdiction over CWA claims).
146. See Tennessee Gas, 921 F. Supp. 2d at 388-92 (holding PADEP actions
done pursuant to federal law have exclusive jurisdiction in circuit courts).
147. Delaware Riverkeeper Network v. Department of Envtl. Prot., No. 2012196-M, 2013 WL 604393, at *1 (Pa. Envtl. Hearing Bd. Feb. 1, 2013)(denying
DRN’s appeal on non-preemption grounds).
148. Id. (denying DRN’s Petition for Supersedeas on merits). For a discussion of the requirements for a Petition for Supersedeas, see supra notes 90-95 and
accompanying text.
149. See Delaware Riverkeeper, 2013 WL 604393, at *1 (acknowledging preemption argument but deciding case on other grounds). For a discussion of how the
EHB disposed of the preemption issue, see infra notes 148-62 and accompanying
text.
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In its analysis, the EHB addressed each of DRN’s specific objections and found DRN did not meet its burden to demonstrate likelihood of success on the merits.150 After disposing of each argument
related to the EGSCP-1 and Chapter 105 permit concerns, the EHB
addressed Tennessee Gas’s preemption claims raised in the company’s Motion to Dismiss.151 Referencing Tennessee Gas’s pending
motion in the district court to enjoin the EHB proceeding, the
EHB held that the parallel appeal and its repercussions played no
role in the final decision.152 EHB conceded that FERC had already
conducted a “lengthy review process” of the NEUP under the conditions of the NGA.153 Furthermore, the EHB conceded that
FERC’s federal regulations had broad preemption of state regulatory processes, including state environmental requirements.154 The
EHB, however, did not find the precedent cited by Tennessee Gas
in support of its motion applicable to the instant case.155
The EHB cited a footnote in NE Hub Partners and stated that
FERC’s direction to Tennessee Gas to secure the necessary state
permits and comply with Pennsylvania’s regulations “changed the
federal preemption analysis from a field preemption analysis to a
conflict preemption analysis.”156 The EHB also cited the Third Circuit’s holding in NE Hub Partners, which stated: “‘[E]ven within an
occupied field federal regulation may tolerate or authorize exercises of state authority.’”157 The EHB believed that when FERC directed Tennessee Gas to obtain the necessary permits from
150. See generally Delaware Riverkeeper, 2013 WL 604393, at *5-14 (analyzing
PADEP’s decision on merits as opposed to pleadings).
151. See id. at *14-15 (discussing Tennessee Gas’s grounds for Motion to
Dismiss).
152. Id. at *14 (stating preemption issue was not factor in deciding case). Essentially, if Tennessee Gas were successful in its appeal, the EHB could not even
decide the case on the merits. See generally Tennessee Gas Pipeline Co. v. Delaware
Riverkeeper Network, 921 F. Supp. 2d 381, 396 (M.D. Pa. 2013) (holding EHB
proceeding enjoined).
153. Delaware Riverkeeper, 2013 WL 604393, at *14 (conceding substantial previous review conducted by FERC).
154. Id. (conceding broad federal regulation of interstate natural gas
projects).
155. Id. (finding case law cited by Tennessee Gas inapplicable). The EHB
classified this situation as one where “FERC directed Tennessee Gas to secure state
environmental permits and approvals, including the state permits under appeal.”
Id.
156. Id. (citing NE Hub Partners, L.P. v. CNG Transmission Corp., 239 F.3d
333, 346 n. 13 (3d Cir. 2001)) (noting FERC direction to state regulators effectively changed analysis from field preemption to conflict preemption). For a discussion of NE Hub Partners, see supra notes 96-114 and accompanying text.
157. Delaware Riverkeeper, 2013 WL 604393, at *14 (holding possibility of some
state regulation within federally regulated area).
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Pennsylvania, FERC changed the preemption analysis.158 In a footnote, the EHB questioned whether state authority under Section
401 Certification under the CWA was preempted.159 Furthermore,
the EHB also recognized FERC’s condition that state requirements
could not conflict with FERC’s Certificate of Public Necessity or
“cause unreasonable delay.”160 The EHB chose not to discuss either of these provisions further because Tennessee Gas declined to
include them in its Motion to Dismiss.161
The EHB rejected Tennessee Gas’s argument that PADEP’s
evaluation for issuing permits was not preempted but the EHB’s
appeals procedure was preempted.162 Furthermore, the panel
found that Pennsylvania courts have found these review processes
to protect constitutional due process through its de novo appeal.163
The panel rejected the argument that “federal preemption allows
federal agencies such as FERC to highjack state permitting procedures or to rewrite state laws . . . .”164 The EHB summarized: “To
separate [PADEP]’s permitting decision from [EHB] appeals procedures violates the longstanding state statutory requirements, ignores longstanding due process safeguards and allows PADEP to act
in a manner that is beyond review under state law.”165 Thus,
FERC’s direction to secure the permits from PADEP included the
possibility of an appeal to the EHB.166
V. CRITICAL ANALYSIS
Prior to Delaware Riverkeeper, the EHB had not defined the
outer limits of its role in the Pennsylvania permitting process, and
put this issue aside in only a few paragraphs.167 The EHB had a
litany of precedent to discuss, and could only refute Tennessee
Gas’s arguments that the NGA preempted the proceeding with sup158. Id. (holding FERC order changed preemption analysis).
159. Id. at 27 n. 17 (noting possible impact of CWA requirements on preemption issue).
160. Id. at 28 n. 18 (acknowledging “unreasonable delay” provision in FERC
order).
161. Id. (forgoing discussion of CWA’s impact on litigation).
162. Delaware Riverkeeper, 2013 WL 604393, at *15 (dismissing Tennessee
Gas’s argument in favor of preemption).
163. Id. at *15 (discussing EHB’s role in providing constitutional due
process).
164. Id. (rejecting Tennessee Gas’s argument stripping EHB of power).
165. Id. (holding precedent and state laws prevent EHB from preemption).
166. Id. (holding PADEP and EHB both part of PA’s permitting process).
167. See generally Delaware Riverkeeper, 2013 WL 604393, at *14-15 (acknowledging Tennessee Gas’s Motion to Dismiss).
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port from a footnote from NE Hub Partners addressing preemption
analysis.168 The EHB did not consider the terms of the FERC order
addressing “unreasonable delay” provisions.169 Nor did the EHB
directly address the provisions in the NGA and the cases that followed in the other circuit courts.170 While the EHB merely acknowledged the provisions in the CWA, in Tennessee Gas, the Middle
District dismissed Tennessee Gas’s preemption argument at the
outset of its decision.171 In comparison to the Middle District’s extensive analysis of the issue, the EHB left much to be desired from a
binding quasi-judicial agency.172
A. The EHB’s Application of NE Hub Partners
In response to Tennessee Gas’s arguments pertaining to precedent, the EHB accurately cited to NE Hub Partners, but misrepresented other crucial holdings and rhetoric stated by the Third
Circuit in that case.173 The EHB seemingly stated that the Third
Circuit was unequivocal in determining that a FERC order to secure
certain state permits changed the analysis to one of conflict preemption.174 This mischaracterizes the Third Circuit’s discussion
that such an order would be part of a “hybrid” scheme where a
completely preempted field of regulation could authorize a degree
of state involvement.175 Further, the Third Circuit went on to state
that a process could be preempted even in a conflict preemption
scenario.176 Several times, the Third Circuit suggested the district
168. For a discussion of the legal background and precedent before Delaware
Riverkeeper, see supra notes 96-141 and accompanying text.
169. See Delaware Riverkeeper, 2013 WL 604393, at *15 (acknowledging “unreasonable delay” provision in FERC Order).
170. For a discussion of two other circuit court cases addressing the NGA/
CWA regulatory scheme, see supra notes 131-37, 138-40 and accompanying text.
171. Compare Delaware Riverkeeper, 2013 WL 604393, at *14-15, with Tennessee
Gas Pipeline Co. LLC v. Delaware Riverkeeper Network, 921 F. Supp. 2d 381, 38586 (M.D. Pa. 2013) (holding pipeline case does not turn on preemption).
172. For further discussion of the Middle District’s opinion, see supra notes
142-50 and accompanying text.
173. Compare Delaware Riverkeeper, 2013 WL 604393, at *14 (discussing NE Hub
Partners), with NE Hub Partners, L.P. v. CNG Transmission Corp., 239 F.3d 333,
346-48 (3d Cir. 2001) (holding processes could be preempted if conflicting with
federal law).
174. See Delaware Riverkeeper, 2013 WL 604393, at *14 (characterizing Third
Circuit’s holding in NE Hub Partners).
175. See NE Hub Partners, 239 F.3d at 346 n. 13 (discussing hybrid preemption
situation). For further discussion on hybrid preemption, see supra notes 110-11
and accompanying text.
176. See NE Hub Partners, 239 F.3d at 348 (holding possibility of preempting
process in conflict with federal law); see also Schneidewind v. ANR Pipeline Co., 485
U.S. 293, 310-11 (1988) (holding that process could be preempted even if it is
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court should find the process itself preempted, but restrained itself
from ruling beyond the specific issues presented.177 NE Hub Partners, therefore, does not unequivocally support Tennessee Gas’s position, but the EHB’s reliance on the Third Circuit’s reasoning and
rationale did not dispose of that argument either.178
B. Leaving the CWA on the Bench
The EHB could have supported its jurisdictional argument
more strongly if it had cited to any of the federal circuit cases discussing the federal-state partnership of the CWA.179 As a review
board for PADEP, the EHB should recognize that Chapter 105 permits required by FERC must comply with the CWA.180 The NGA
itself authorizes the states to play a role in CWA certifications.181 In
comparison, the court in Tennessee Gas quickly identified this issue
in Tennessee Gas’s preemption argument, citing to cases such as
Islander East and AES Sparrows.182
The EHB mentioned the possible implications of the CWA in a
footnote, but such a grant of regulatory powers to the states from
the federal government should lead its argument.183 The due process arguments the EHB relied on were only marginally persuasive,
when DRN had been working closely with FERC and PADEP
throughout as evidenced from the technical deficiency letters
PADEP sent to Tennessee Gas incorporating notes from DRN.184 It
inevitable that process conflicts with federal law). Thus, even if EHB review did
not exactly conflict with federal law, there was an imminent situation that it might.
See Delaware Riverkeeper, 2013 WL 604393, at *14.
177. See generally NE Hub Partners, 239 F.3d at 348-49 (suggesting possibility of
preempted EHB review).
178. For further discussion of NE Hub Partners, see supra notes 96-114 and
accompanying text.
179. See generally Islander E. Pipeline Co. v. Conn. Dep’t. of Envtl. Prot., 482
F.3d 79, 83-90 (2d Cir. 2006); AES Sparrows Point LNG v. Wilson, 589 F.3d 721,
723-25 (4th Cir. 2009). For a discussion of these cases, see supra notes 130-41 and
accompanying text.
180. For further discussion of Chapter 105 requirements, see supra notes 7681 and accompanying text.
181. See 15 U.S.C. § 717b(d)(3) (2012) (providing CWA exceptions to NGA).
182. See Tennessee Gas Pipeline Co. LLC v. Delaware Riverkeeper Network,
921 F. Supp. 2d 381, 392-93 (M.D. Pa. 2013) (discussing cases involving CWA’s
intrusion on federal preemption under NGA).
183. Compare id. at 386-87 (holding case does not turn on preemption when
CWA involved), with Delaware Riverkeeper Network v. Department of Envtl. Prot.,
No. 2012-196-M, 2013 WL 604393, at *14 (Pa. Envtl. Hearing Bd. Feb. 1, 2013)(declining to discuss CWA’s effect on federal preemption).
184. See Delaware Riverkeeper, 2013 WL 604393, at *4-5 (discussing extensive
role external groups played in evaluating project).
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is true that Tennessee Gas did not address the CWA issue in its
motion, but it was certainly brought up by PADEP in its briefs.185
C. What About the NGA?
The EHB also failed to provide an interpretation of the NGA as
a matter of first impression.186 In comparison to the court’s approach in Tennessee Gas, which thoroughly interpreted the NGA in
light of the amendment in EPACT, the EHB did not examine the
plain meaning of the language in the NGA.187 Furthermore, the
EHB failed to examine the Congressional intent of EPACT or other
interpretations of the NGA from previous judicial opinions.188
Lastly, the dismissal of the NGA cases cited by Tennessee Gas is
contrary to the treatment of such case law by the court in Tennessee
Gas.189 While it is true that none of these cases were precisely on
point with the facts before the EHB, decisions like Rockies Express
and Schneidewind suggest that the EHB proceeding could be preempted.190 Therefore, the EHB could have attempted to distinguish these cases explicitly, or more thoroughly, to justify its
decision.191
The EHB’s rhetoric regarding the “highjacking” of state permitting procedures seems directed less at the functions of PADEP,
but rather used as a defense mechanism for its own jurisdiction.192
The EHB is not made up of Article III judges; it is comprised of
185. See Brief of Department of Environmental Protection In Support of Its
Opposition to Tennessee Gas Pipeline Company, L.L.C.’s Mot. Dismiss, No. 2012196-M, 8-12 (discussing CWA exceptions to NGA preemption arguments).
186. Compare Rockies Express Pipeline v. Indiana State Natural Res. Comm’n,
2010 WL 3882513, at *2-6 (S.D. Ind.) (holding state review process preempted by
NGA when pipeline already built), with Delaware Riverkeeper, 2013 WL 604393, at *12 (discussing situation where pipe has not been built and state permits are authorized pursuant to CWA certifications). The EHB was correct in determining the
cases cited by Tennessee Gas were not precisely on point, but had similar points of
emphasis. Id. at *14.
187. See generally Tennessee Gas Pipeline Co. LLC v. Delaware Riverkeeper,
921 F. Supp. 2d 381, 388-92 (M.D. Pa. 2013) (discussing plain language of
EPACT).
188. See generally id. at 391-92 (discussing legislative history of EPACT).
189. Compare id. at 385-86 (acknowledging cases finding NGA preempts state
regulation speaks to instant issue), with Delaware Riverkeeper, 2013 WL 604393, at
*14 (holding similar cases not applicable).
190. For a discussion of Schneidewind, see supra notes 115-21 and accompanying text. For a discussion of Rockies Express, see supra notes 122-29 and accompanying text.
191. For a more in-depth discussion of the opinion in Tennessee Gas, see supra
notes 142-50 and accompanying text.
192. See generally Delaware Riverkeeper, 2013 WL 604393, at *15 (holding Tennessee Gas would be stripping EHB of legal duties).
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practiced lawyers in the field of environmental law in Pennsylvania.193 Thus, it is not surprising that the EHB focused on upholding Pennsylvania state law over ceding its authority to the
federal government.194 Its analysis directed attention away from
federal laws and toward the rationality of defying the federal law
when the DRN motion would be struck down on the merits regardless.195 In a way, the EHB invoked a canon of avoidance to prevent
a threat to its own authority.196
VI. IMPACT
With increased demand for transporting natural gas along the
Eastern seaboard, it is highly probable that natural gas companies,
whose interstate pipelines stretch through Pennsylvania, will need
to construct large new facilities.197 PADEP’s docket of permit applications on these projects will also continue to grow.198 Grassroots
organizations, such as DRN, will continue to fight these proposals,
leading to more opportunities for conflict between FERC and the
EHB.199 Despite the counter-argument of the EHB, the decision in
Tennessee Gas effectively reduces the EHB’s role in protecting Pennsylvania’s permitting procedures in interstate gas projects.200
Even so, in light of the EHB’s decision, strong advocacy groups
like DRN may petition the EHB, if only to delay the inevitable NGA
193. For further discussion of the EHB and its members, see supra 83-89 and
accompanying text.
194. See generally Delaware Riverkeeper, 2013 WL 604393, at *15 (discussing
ramifications on state law if EHB held otherwise).
195. See generally id. at *1, *15 (denying DRN’s petition on merits and avoiding discussion federal law ramifications).
196. See generally Clark v. Martinez, 543 U.S. 371, 385 (2005) (discussing canon of constitutional avoidance). While the instant case does not deal with this
issue specifically, the decision in Delaware Riverkeeper invoked some sort of quasiavoidance doctrine.
197. See Laura Legere & Katie Colaneri, Pennsylvania Shale Production Continued to Grow in 2013, STATEIMPACT (Feb. 19, 2014) http://stateimpact.npr.org/
pennsylvania/2014/02/19/pennsylvania-shale-production-continued-to-grow-in2013/ (reporting growing annual natural gas production in Pennsylvania and expectations of further growth).
198. For a discussion of PADEP’s permit procedure, see supra notes 75-82 and
accompanying text.
199. See NE Hub Partners, L.P. v. CNG Transmission Corp., 239 F.3d 333, 34849 (3d Cir. 2001) (suggesting EHB review of FERC orders could be preempted in
different case).
200. See Tennessee Gas Pipeline Co. LLC v. Delaware Riverkeeper Network,
921 F. Supp. 2d 381, 390-91 (M.D. Pa. 2013) (rejecting EHB’s argument that
“[ ]appeal to the Board protects important constitutional due process right[s]”).
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arguments from interstate gas companies.201 The EHB’s defiant
stance towards federal preemption may continue in other cases
with other federal issues.202 The decision in Tennessee Gas, however,
may call into question the credibility of the EHB.203 The panel may
limit itself to deciding state law questions, and leave more complex
federal questions to other, more qualified panels such as the Circuit
Courts.204 The federal preemption concerns in this case have not
been clearly addressed by the circuit courts, and the complexities
these issues present are beyond the EHB’s expertise.205 Thus, interstate gas companies like Tennessee Gas whose permits are appealed
to the EHB may bypass motions to dismiss within the EHB proceeding, and go directly to the circuit courts seeking to enjoin the proceedings.206 This was the first time the EHB discussed the
possibility its proceedings could be preempted, and considering the
decisions subsequent, it could be the last.207
Adam Settle*
201. For further discussion of DRN and its actions, see supra notes 12-19 and
accompanying text.
202. See generally Delaware Riverkeeper Network v. Department of Envtl. Prot.,
No. 2012-196-M, 2013 WL 604393, at *15 (Pa. Envtl. Hearing Bd. Feb. 1,
2013)(holding Tennessee Gas would be stripping EHB of legal duties).
203. See generally Tennessee Gas, 921 F. Supp. 2d at 390-91 (holding EHB not
authorized by FERC to adjudicate interstate natural gas claims).
204. See generally 35 P.S. §§ 7513-16 (Supp.2000). For a further discussion of
the makeup and role of the EHB, see supra 83-89 and accompanying text.
205. For further discussion of precedent in this arena, see supra notes 96-141
and accompanying text.
206. See James D. Elliot, Tennessee Gas Pipeline Company Goes on the Offensive,
SPILMAN THOMAS & BATTLE (Feb. 26, 2013) http://www.spilmanlaw.com/resources
/attorney-authored-articles/marcellus-fairway/tennessee-gas-pipeline-company-llcgoes-on-the-off (discussing effect of Tennessee Gas on ability of energy companies to
protect against unnecessary delays).
207. See id. (discussing whether EHB has role in these claims).
* J.D. Candidate, 2016, Villanova University School of Law; B.A., 2013, Colgate University.
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